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ABSTRACT
Australia's manufactured exports have grown rapidly since the mid-1980s.  The
growth of Australia's trading partners and the overall depreciation of the exchange
rate, while important, do not fully explain this growth.  This paper seeks to explain
the remaining growth in reference to firms' cost structures, in particular their sunk
cost structures.  A model is developed.  It shows how, in the presence of sunk costs,
a shock to the economy can cause a permanent increase in the level of exports.  This
model is applied to Australia's manufactured exports.  The results suggest that their
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1. INTRODUCTION
The process of international integration has been accompanied by important changes
in Australia's balance of payments.  One such change is the marked increase in the
nation's export orientation, parallelling an increase in import penetration.  Another is
the diversification of the type of goods that are exported.  Historically, Australia has
exported mainly primary commodities.  Although such commodities continue to
account for the majority of Australia's merchandise exports, manufactured export
volumes have grown strongly in recent years.  In fact, since the mid-1980s, they
have grown at twice the rate of traditional exports.  How can the performance of
manufactured exports be explained?
In popular discussion it has been argued that Australian exporters of manufactures
have established so-called "beachheads" in foreign markets.1  If so, it can be
expected that sales to these markets will not be abandoned readily even when
economic conditions faced by exporters change. Thus the pattern of export growth
that has emerged since the mid-1980s may persist for some time, contributing to a
structural change in the nation's merchandise trade.
There is a growing body of literature that seeks to explain structural changes in
patterns of trade in the context of hysteresis.2 It is argued that, following a shock to
an economic system, there is a change in the pattern of trade that fails to be reversed
when the shock is reversed (Baldwin 1988; Baldwin and Krugman 1989).  Failure to
revert to the initial equilibrium arises because agents incur sunk costs when entering
a market (Dixit 1989).
The existing literature arose to explain the apparently hysteretic effects of the
prolonged swing in the value of the US dollar during the 1980s.3  It tends to focus
1 The landing of the Allies at Normandy in World War II established a "beachhead".
2 Hysteresis is the failure of a shocked variable to return to its original state when the cause of
the shock is fully reversed.
3 For example, Baldwin (1988) found evidence for an altered pass-through of import prices.2
on exchange rate movements as the potential source of a permanent change in trade
volumes.  However, it is plausible that other shocks may also be important.  The
decision of firms to export will be influenced by the profitability of selling output
locally compared with selling to foreign markets.  Therefore, changes in world and
domestic demand could, in principle, be as important as changes in the exchange
rate.
In this paper, a standard export model is altered by allowing for the existence of
sunk costs.  In the world of the sunk-cost model, agents do not necessarily respond
in the standard way to economic forces.  Sunk costs effectively create a hurdle that
any would-be exporter must surmount.  Exporters may not appear to respond to
changed incentives (such as tariff reductions) until a threshold value is reached.
Furthermore, even if the shock is reversed (as exchange rate and demand shocks can
be) they may not abandon their markets, having paid their sunk costs.
The main theoretical result of the model is that both demand and exchange rate
shocks to the economic system can generate hysteresis.  Another result is that tariff
reductions may appear to have no effect on exports until a threshold is reached.  An
attempt is made to relate this theoretical model to the actual performance of
manufactured exports.  Econometric and survey data support a structural break in
the mid-1980s.  A case for hysteresis is developed where the catalysts for change
are the historic mid-1980s exchange rate depreciation, the most recent recession and
the process of internationalisation begun in the early 1970s (embodied in tariff
reductions).  It is also suggested that the existence of positive  externalities has
enabled and will continue to enable new exporters to benefit from the presence of
Australian firms already established in overseas markets.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, stylised facts are presented. In
Section 3, a sunk cost model is developed. In Section 4, some evidence of hysteresis
in Australia's manufactured exports is considered, along with evidence relating to
other explanations.  Finally, implications and conclusions are drawn.3
2. MANUFACTURED EXPORTS: THE STYLIZED FACTS
Figure 1 shows real manufactured exports over the past two decades.4  Since
1985/86 manufactured export volumes have grown by 16 per cent per annum.  In
fact, they now account for more than 20 per cent of total merchandise exports,
compared with under 11 per cent in 1985/86.  Reflecting increased international
integration, imports have likewise trended upward over the period
(Reserve Bank 1992).















The timing of major movements in the growth rates of manufactured exports
suggests some responsiveness to macroeconomic shocks.  For instance, in recent
years, there have been substantial swings in Australia's real exchange rate,
fluctuations in economic activity and the continued dismantling of trade restrictions.
Each of these factors is expected to have impacted on manufactured export growth.
4 The definition of manufactures used in this paper excludes some simply transformed
manufactures, such as iron and steel and non-ferrous metals.  It also excludes processed food
and beverages.  Further details are provided in Appendix D.4
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the real trade-weighted exchange rate and
the growth of manufactured exports.5  To varying degrees each of the periods of
appreciation correspond to a decline in manufactured export growth.  Similarly,
episodes of depreciation tend to be associated with accelerations in the growth rate
of manufactured exports (albeit lagged).  Thus real exchange rate movements
appear, in general, to be negatively correlated with the growth in manufactured
exports.  However, since 1986/87, a situation has emerged where export growth has
been sustained despite episodes of real appreciation.  One possible explanation is
that the sharp depreciation of the mid-1980s may have had an hysteretic effect.
Figure 2: Manufactured Exports and the Exchange Rate


















5 Pitchford (1993) alludes to the controversy surrounding the correct measure of the real
exchange rate.  This may influence its perceived impact on exports.  However, for the sake of
simplicity, the measure used in this paper is the real TWI calculated in Jones and Wilkinson
(1990).
6 In this section, all series graphed on an annual growth basis are shifted left by one year to
compensate for the phase shift introduced by the transformation from levels to annual growth
rates.  That is, a growth rate attributed to December 1985 on the graph refers to the
year-on-year growth between 1985 and 1986.5
Similarly, it has been suggested that the recent recession has been a factor
contributing to the surge in export growth; the fall in domestic demand may have
caused manufacturers to direct production to overseas markets.  However, as
shown in Figure 3, no such relationship between exports and domestic demand was
evident in the 1982/83 recession.
Figure 3: Manufactured Exports and Recessions
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It might also be expected that export growth would be directly related to economic
activity in the markets in which they are sold.  Much attention has been paid to the
growth in Asia and the attendant expansion of potential export markets in that
region.  Certainly, as shown in Figure 4, there is a broad positive correlation
between the industrial production of Australia's trading partners and export growth.
However, recent growth in overseas demand has been associated with higher-than-
expected rates of export growth.7  Growth in overseas demand, particularly Asian
demand, does not appear to fully explain the growth in manufactured exports since
the mid-1980s.
7 The co-movements observed in the series up until the mid-1980s suggest lower elasticities.6
Figure 4: Manufactured Exports and Overseas Demand



















Finally, increased export orientation may also be a response to the dismantling of
trade restrictions.  A measure of the effective rate of assistance for manufacturing
(based on Plunkett et al. (1992)) is illustrated in Figure 5.  The sharp cut in tariffs in
1973 coincided with a fall in exports, whereas the gradual lowering of assistance in
the second half of the 1980s was associated with strong export growth.

















Effective Rate of Assistance to
Manufacturing (level, LHS)7
It is clear that the growth of manufactured exports in the late 1980s is not easily
explained by a single cause.  However, the graphs have suggested an interesting
puzzle.  The surge in exports following the mid-1980s depreciation has continued in
spite of subsequent episodes of appreciation.  Furthermore, the apparent strength of
the link between the recent recession and export growth stands in stark contrast to
the lack of effect of the 1982/83 recession.
The following sections of the paper explore some potential explanations for these
anomalies.  Central to the analysis will be a model which allows exporting firms to
have sunk costs.  That model is now examined.
3. A SUNK COST MODEL
Consider first the properties of the standard export model.  In this model, domestic
firms compete in perfectly competitive markets.  Entry into the world market is
assumed to be costless and there are no transportation costs.  Firms are price takers
in the world market for traded goods and hence, the local price (PL) and the world
price (PW) are the same when expressed in a common currency.  The quantity of
goods exported equals the excess of domestic supply over domestic demand, as
shown in Figure 6.








What will be referred to as the "sunk cost model" is the standard model with an
additional assumption; firms must pay a once-off sunk cost (C) when they first
export.  Exporting will only commence if it improves the expected present value of8
profits by at least C.  In general, the presence of C drives a wedge between the local
price and the world price.  There is no automatic tendency for PL to equal PW,
because there is no profitable way for firms to exploit the difference in prices.









In general, models that incorporate sunk costs are characterised by a
"band of inaction" where movements of a causal variable within some band fail to
have an effect.  For example, an exchange rate band of inaction in an export model
refers to a range of values for the exchange rate (the causal variable) that will not
motivate firms to commence or cease exporting.  The so called "lower bound" of the
band of inaction is the value of the exchange rate that will make local firms export
for the first time, while the "upper bound" is the value of the exchange rate that will
make hitherto exporting firms cease exporting.8
In the sunk cost model of this paper, the causal variable is the price differential
PW-PL.  A high value of the differential (the upper bound) will motivate firms to
commence exporting, while a low value (the lower bound) will motivate exporting
firms to cease exporting and instead sell their output on the domestic market.
Movements of the price differential within the band of inaction (i.e. between the
upper and lower bounds) will not change the number of exporting firms.  For
simplicity, the upper bound will be referred to as d, while the lower bound will be
8 The exchange rate in this example is expressed as the foreign currency price of the local
currency.9
assumed to be zero.9  Subsequently, a change in the number of firms involved in
exporting will be referred to as a "change in market structure".
Dixit (1989) discusses the factors that influence the width of a band of inaction.  In
his model, the degree of variation in the causal variable is shown to be a surprisingly
important determinant of the width of the band; the greater the variation the wider
the band.  Using numerical examples, he also argues that variability in a causal
variable can create a wide band of inaction even if the sunk costs are quite small.10
This insight becomes important when evidence is presented for the existence of
sunk costs.
To see how variability can influence the band of inaction, imagine that PW-PL is a
random walk.  For expository ease, assume that a firm faces this choice in each
period: it can pay the sunk cost and then export forever or it can sell domestically
and put off till the next period the decision about when to enter the export market.
Further assume that, for the first time, PW-PL has risen to a level high enough for
potential exporters to just cover the sunk cost C.  That is, the expected present value
of exporting now is zero.11  The current price differential would be the top of the
band of inaction (i.e. exports would commence) if the future value of PW-PL was not
expected to vary.  However, in the presence of future variability it is not optimal to
export immediately.  Since it is possible that PW-PL will rise further, a rational firm
can do even better by remaining uncommitted for one period.  If the price
differential does rise, the firm can pay the sunk cost then and get a positive expected
present value.  If PW-PL falls next period, it can decide not to pay the sunk cost, and
wait a further period.  Viewed from the original period, the expected present value
of waiting is positive, while the expected present value of exporting immediately is
zero.
Nevertheless, this does not imply that there is no upper bound.  If PW-PL in the
current period is high enough for exporters to cover sunk costs and earn a return in
9 In other words, when the local price exceeds the world price a representative firm will cease
exporting and instead sell on the domestic market.  This is consistent with the simple model in
Appendix A, but not with the more sophisticated analysis of  Dixit (1989) subsequently
discussed in the text.
10 However, sunk costs must be non-zero for there to be a band of inaction.
11 Here and subsequently, the "present value of exporting" refers to the value of the extra profits
attainable compared to selling locally.10
the current period, there is an opportunity cost of waiting.  There is, therefore, a
value of PW-PL which is so high that the foregone revenue associated with waiting
equals the benefit of waiting.  A value of PW-PL higher than this motivates exports
immediately.  This is the true upper bound (d).  The band of inaction is, therefore,
wider because of the variation in the causal variable.12
Earlier literature has tended to focus on the exchange rate as the sole source of
movements in PW-PL.  However, changes in world demand or domestic demand will
also alter this price differential.  Therefore shocks to exports via these causal
variables will now be examined.13  The hysteretic effect on exports of a
subsequently reversed shock will be shown diagrammatically.  The shocks
considered will be classified as external (changes in world demand or the exchange
rate) and  internal (changes in domestic demand).  Some other market-altering
shocks will also be considered.
A simple three-period model consistent with the following diagrammatic exposition
is described in Appendix A.  Firms sell all their output overseas or domestically;
they do not sell some in each market.  Shifts in market structure are equivalent to
shifts in a local supply curve.  This curve is the horizontal summation of the
marginal cost curves of those firms supplying the local market at a point in time.
Firms make their export decisions sequentially according to the following rules:
export for the first time if  (PW-PL) > d
cease exporting if (PW-PL) < 0
In addition, local and exporting firms choose output so that marginal cost is equated
to the relevant output price: PL
 and PW
  respectively.
12 Dixit (1989) also shows how the lower bound falls with increased uncertainty in the causal
variable.
13 The issue of how the future variances and covariances of the causal variables effect the width
of the band of inaction is sidelined.  A formal extension of Dixit (1989) which allows for these
variances and covariances is not attempted.  The model in Appendix A assumes that firms
export as soon as sunk costs can be covered.11
3.1 External Shocks: The Exchange Rate and World Demand
Exchange rate depreciation or an increase in world demand should, other things
being constant, be reflected in a rise in the world price of exports, when measured in
local currency.14  The hysteretic effects of such an external shock, and its
subsequent reversal, are now shown.  Figure 8 shows the situation in period one,
before the shock.15
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Local supply and demand are equated at PL, and PW-PL is in the band of inaction.
There are no exports: the higher price for exports will not compensate a firm
adequately over the three periods for its entry cost.  In Figure 9, the world price
rises due to an external shock.
14 This abstracts from productivity shocks which would effect both the exchange rate and the
total supply curve.  See Appendix C for a discussion of the associated empirical difficulties.
15 In subsequent diagrams, numerical subscripts denote the time period.12














The new world price exceeds PL (the local equilibrium) by more than d; firms will
want to export.  As firms leave the domestic market one-by-one, domestic supply16
contracts toward  s2, putting upward pressure on the local price.  This process
continues until the marginal firm no longer faces a local price that differs from the
world price by more than  d.  The new equilibrium has a proportion,  bc/ac, of
exporting firms.  However, the level of exports is not bc.  As exporting firms are
producing up to the point where marginal cost equals world price, the level of
exports is shown by the segment x2 between the two supply curves at that price.
Now consider the reversal of the shock so that PW returns to its initial level (see
Figure 10).
As PW falls, the differential between  PW and the new  PL falls into the band of
inaction.  It will not be optimal for any new firms to export.  As PW falls each
exporting firm will produce less output.  Aggregate exports will fall to x3 as a result.
However, firms that have already paid their sunk costs will continue to export, so
long as the world price is higher than the local one.17  Thus, despite a reversal of the
shock, some exports continue to occur.  There is hysteresis.
16 If the local price rises above Pw or falls below PW-d, the number of firms supplying the
domestic market changes.  This is shown graphically by dashing the s line outside these limits.
17 That is, while PW-PL
 exceeds the lower bound of the band of inaction.13











3.2 Internal Shocks: Domestic Demand
In this section the hysteretic effects of a large decline in domestic demand, and its
subsequent reversals, are shown.  Figure 11 shows the situation in period one,
before the shock.  Again, no firm is initially exporting.
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In the second period there is a fall in domestic demand so that D1 shifts to D2.18
18 The local demand for the exportable good shifts in response to GNE.14















The decline in demand initially results in a local price which differs from the world
price by more than d.  Local supply will therefore fall to s2 and exporting will occur.
When the shock is reversed (and demand shifts back to D1) what will happen to
exports?













As local supply has contracted, the new local price will be higher than it was in
period one.  The price differs from PW by less than d, stopping entry of new firms
into the export market.  However,  firms that have paid their entry costs will
continue to export.  There is no change in aggregate exports because the output
price for these exporting firms has not changed.  This is in spite of the shock being
reversed.  There is hysteresis.15
The differences between the sunk cost model and the standard model are most
apparent in the face of an internal shock.  Unlike the standard model, shocks to
domestic demand which leave PW-PL in the band of inaction have no effect  on
aggregate exports.  However, external shocks alter output for every exporting firm
by changing PW (the output price).  Provided that some firms are exporting, any
external shock will affect the aggregate (as in the standard model), even if there is
no change in market structure.
3.3 The Vanguard Effect
It has been shown that firms that have already paid their sunk costs will continue to
export, so long as the world price is higher than the local one.  In the popular
vernacular, each firm has established a "beachhead" so that export sales are not
given up when market conditions change.  In fact, "beachhead" is often used as a
metaphor for hysteresis in exports.  However, the beachhead notion may be applied
to a group of firms, as well as an individual firm.  A military beachhead enables later
forces to enter the battle more easily.  With regard to exports, initial entrants may
form a "vanguard" which reduces the sunk cost for subsequent entrants.19
In terms of the model, a fall in C makes it optimal for firms to leave the local market
in response to a smaller price differential.  Consider the extreme case where one
firm paying  C means that other firms do not have to pay  C.  The final period
solution of the model for all three shocks is shown in the following diagram.
19 A vanguard is the "foremost part of an army or fleet" (Oxford Dictionary).  Its existence
creates a free-rider problem.  It also may help explain the existence of industry organisations
the role of which is to facilitate entry of firms to foreign markets.  If it is a policy objective to
increase exports, the government can subsidize the vanguard.  As well as encouraging outward
focus, organisations such as AUSTRADE already fulfil this purpose.  For example, Export
Marketing Development Grants cover marketing expenditures of firms which export less than
$25 million worth of merchandise.16










This can be recognised as the standard model.  A comparison with the final
equilibria for both the internal and external shocks shows that hysteresis can be
magnified by the effects of a vanguard.20
3.4 Tariff Reductions
The discussion thus far has been restricted to movements in world price, domestic
demand and sunk costs.  This restriction has facilitated the discussion of hysteresis
using the sunk cost model.  However, an important class of shocks can be
represented by a shift in the  supply curve.21  If declines in protection result in
cheaper imported inputs, the cost curves for Australian manufacturing will shift
down.  This is equivalent to an outward shift in the supply curve.  In the following
diagram, imported inputs are an argument of supply.
20 An interesting corollary to the vanguard effect is that future hysteretic effects will be less
pronounced if the sunk costs are made smaller by the vanguard.
21 Some of these shocks, such as microeconomic reform and tariff reductions, are not expected to
be reversed and therefore cannot be "hysteretic" in the strict sense of the word.  They are,
nevertheless, interesting.17
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While PW-PL remains in the band of inaction, no new firms will export.  However,
exports will increase if PW-PL exceeds d.  Therefore efficiency gains from cheaper
imported inputs (or microeconomic reform) could induce an apparently "sudden"
rise in exports.
It has been established that the presence of sunk costs brings with it the possibility
of hysteresis.  The source of hysteresis may be world demand or domestic demand,
in addition to the more conventional exchange rate channel highlighted in earlier
models.  Furthermore, the sunk cost model describes two facets of international
integration.  Export vanguards reduce sunk costs for subsequent entrants, thereby
accelerating the momentum of an export surge.  Tariff reductions (or microeconomic
reform) may proceed for some considerable time, apparently without effect.  In
reality, the outward shift in the supply curve places downward pressure on local
prices without effecting exports, until a threshold is reached where new exporters
can cover their sunk costs.  The resultant growth in exports may appear to be
sudden, and unrelated to its true explanators.  In what remains of the paper, an
attempt is made to relate the experience of the 1980s to the analytical framework
that has been developed.18
4. EVIDENCE OF HYSTERESIS
The shocks examined in the theoretical framework were chosen because they
occurred in the 1980s.  In this section, it is asserted that the sunk cost model adds to
the understanding of the recent growth in exports.  Then evidence is brought to bear
on that assertion.
4.1 History in Terms of the Model
The 1982/83 recession had little effect on exports.  The model suggests a possible
explanation for this; exporters faced a price differential in the band of inaction.
Though the recession would have tended to reduce profits from domestic sales, the
exchange rate may not have been low enough to generate export profits sufficient to
cover sunk costs.
The historic  depreciation in the mid-1980s was a catalytic event for would-be
exporters.  In the sunk cost model, the world price (in local currency) rose to an
extent that encouraged firms to pay their sunk costs and export for the first time.22
Even though the exchange rate movement was partly reversed in the latter half of
the decade, the model predicts that firms that had paid their sunk costs would tend
to remain in their established markets.  The strength of this alleged hysteretic effect
depends on the exchange rate expectations of the individual firms at that time.
Optimistic firms may have believed that the favourable shock would persist.  These
firms would have had a narrower band of inaction because the expected present
value of exporting would have been unrealistically high.  Note the following
statement made at that time by Senator Button:
"Manufacturers should be making their investment plans on the basis that the dollar
will remain very close to its current levels and that the Government will successfully
influence the course of wage and price growth to preserve gains we have made in
international competitiveness" (quoted in Dunkerly 1986, p.80).
22 Dwyer, Kent and Pease (1993) argue that export price pass-through is not as rapid for
manufactures as it is for commodities.  Nevertheless, to whatever extent an exchange rate
depreciation causes a decline in the foreign currency price of Australian manufactures, the
demand for exports should increase.  In this case hysteresis may occur because the increased
demand enables sunk costs to be covered.19
However, other commentators, such as Dr. E. Shann, were more cautious:
"... eventually our real exchange rate will rise.  There is thus a window of
opportunity for manufacturers with short lead times to earn profits.  However, for
projects with longer lead times there is a risk of the real exchange rate rising before
they have recouped their costs, or paid off the overheads involved in establishing
markets overseas" (Shann 1986, p.15).
In the sunk cost model, the recent recession could have had a different effect on
aggregate exports than the 1982/83 recession.  This is because the exchange rate
was lower, overall, than it was in the early 1980s.  All other things held constant,
PW-PL was closer to the upper bound of the band of inaction.  Slack domestic
demand could have put downward pressure on prices in both recessions, but
expected export profits in the early 1990s may have been relatively greater by virtue
of the lower exchange rate.
The model can explain some of the surge in exporting since the mid-1980s by the
vanguard effect.  Responding to the depreciation and the recession, pathbreaking
firms established themselves in overseas markets.  Their presence reduced entry
costs for subsequent firms.  Furthermore, the influence of the  tariff reductions,
begun in the early 1970s, at some point began to have an influence.  The efficiency
gains from using imported inputs steadily improved the competitiveness of
exporters.  However, in the sunk cost model, the effect on exports could have been
sudden, as the threshold was reached, rather than steady.23
4.2 Methodology
Empirical analysis of sunk cost models is difficult.  A comprehensive analysis would
seem to require (unavailable) cost data for firms over a wide range of industries.
There is the added difficulty of modelling export equations, which has traditionally
met with little success.24  As a result, the literature tends to focus on hysteresis in
23 Sunk costs issues aside, gradual tariff reductions could also exhibit a sudden effect if, at some
indefinable point, they came to be regarded as permanent.
24 Consequently, the most established body of empirical literature on trade flows is that relating
to single equation models of import demand.  In contrast, modelling of exports is less
established,  Key examples of the literature on export models are Leamer and Stern (1970),
Goldstein and Khan (1978) and, with respect to Australia, Ryder and Upcher (1990).20
imports.  Econometric validation of various models, if it exists, rests on limited
evidence, such as the significance of structural breaks.25
The approach adopted in this paper is to have a simple model which is open to the
scrutiny of testable implications.  Many of the implications of the sunk cost model,
including the existence of a structural break, are observed in the data.  With this a
case is built for the sunk cost model and hysteresis.  The difficulties experienced in
modelling exports motivate a sample survey.  The results of the survey are
consistent with the econometric results.
At the outset, a distinction is made between building a case for the sunk cost model,
on the one hand, and building a case for hysteresis on the other.  These beliefs are
discussed separately for both the survey and the econometric evidence.  First,
evidence is presented in support of the sunk cost model.  However, even if sunk
costs can be shown to have been important, the economy may not have received the
sequence of shocks necessary to change the local supply curve.  That is, evidence in
favour of the sunk cost model is necessary but not sufficient to establish hysteresis.
The second step, therefore, involves examining export growth since the mid-1980s
in light of the sunk cost model.  Armed with a prior about the correct model,
statistical evidence builds a case for hysteretic effects.
4.3 A Sample Survey of Manufacturing Exporters
A small scale survey was carried out to establish the importance of sunk costs.
AUSTRADE provided the first 100 exporters from an alphabetical listing of its
database.  The listing was confined to companies in NSW  with annual export
revenue of between $2 million and $50 million.26  These firms were contacted in
alphabetical order until 30 successful interviews occurred.27  This procedure
25 Baldwin (1988) infers hysteresis from a structural break in an import equation, while
Dixit (1989) discusses hysteresis using a model with imposed parameter values.
26 The export revenue range was chosen to be comparable with the McKinsey and Co. (1992)
study.  See Appendix B.
27 Some of the firms on the database did not export manufactured goods and some had ceased
exporting.  A preliminary screening question enabled those firms to be excluded from the
sample.  Furthermore, firms were also excluded when the first word of their name described
their business (e.g. "Agribusiness") and therefore determined their alphabetical order.21
approximates a random sample of Australian exporters that export between
$2 million and $50 million.28
The survey supported the existence of a vanguard, where pathbreaking exporters
reduce sunk costs for subsequent entrants.  For example, some respondents argued
that the profile of Australian goods established by the vanguard made subsequent
entry easier.  Other respondents indicated that the vanguard helped new firms by
passing on information at industry forums or in networks.29
















































































































































































28 It is reasonable to assume that companies' costs are totally unrelated to their order in the
alphabetical listing.  Also, it has also been argued that the characteristics of NSW exporting
firms can be generalized to Australian firms (Daly et al. 1992).  Companies consent to being on
the AUSTRADE database because they have asked for assistance, to be informed of seminars
or to be matched with buyers in overseas markets.  A self selection problem may arise if only
those companies with large sunk costs approach AUSTRADE.  On the other hand, the fact
that AUSTRADE has paid some of their sunk costs may mean that they do not realize the
magnitude of them.  It was usually necessary to contact Managing Directors or Financial
Controllers and this meant that many of the interviews were conducted under time constraints.
Anticipating this problem, an abbreviated version of the survey was offered to executives if
they were too busy (questions 3 to 12 inclusive).  This proved effective in raising the response
rate.
29 Of the 25 firms answering the relevant question, 2 stated that other firms had made their entry
easier and 2 claimed to have made subsequent entry by their competitors easier.22
The survey respondents indicated that there were large one-off fixed costs.  At the
5 per cent level, it was established that more than half the firms had at least one
significant sunk cost.30  The most significant individual sunk costs were in the area
of export-related plant and equipment.31  Even if the size of these costs are
exaggerated, the analysis of Dixit (1989) has an important point to make.  The
combination of sunk costs and uncertainty means that large economic shocks may
be necessary to change market structure.  This implies that the sunk cost model is
more realistic than the standard model.  Armed with this prior, the late-1980s export
surge is now given a sunk cost interpretation.
The exchange rate was nominated by 60 per cent of firms as being an important
factor in their initial export decision.32  Furthermore, the survey shows that
one quarter of firms currently exporting began in 1986, the year of an historic $A
depreciation.33  If the sunk cost model is correct, this could signify that the
depreciation enabled a large number of firms to cover their sunk costs and establish
beachheads.
30 "Significant" means that the cost was taken note of when firms were considering an export
venture.  In describing the costs as sunk, it is implicitly assumed that they cannot be recouped
if the firm exits the market.
31 If capital is rented, then the costs are fixed rather than sunk.  However, survey respondents
indicated that their spending on these items declined once they had established themselves in a
foreign market.  The survey did not explore the issue of how saleable capital was in the event
of exit.
32 12 respondents indicated this out of 20 who answered the relevant question.
33 Firms indicated the year in which they exported more than 10 per cent of their output.  In a
study by McKinsey and Co. (1992), 1986 was also highlighted as a significant entry year.23
Figure 17: First Year Exports Exceed 10 per cent of Production34



































































































The survey also indicated that the most recent recession has had a greater impact on
exports than any other recession.  Of the respondents, 40 per cent indicated that
they had significantly increased their exports in response to it.  (Only one firm
indicated that a previous recession had caused a significant increase in exports.35)
The importance of the last recession is consistent with the description of hysteresis
in the late 1980s.  The combination of  slack domestic demand and a (generally)
lower exchange rate pushed PW-PL above d, increasing the discounted future stream
of export profits to the point where paying sunk costs was optimal.
34 It was confirmed that the 1986 observation did, in fact, reflect an increase in export volumes.
All firms which nominated that year were contacted again to make sure that the increased share
represented an increase in actual merchandise.
35 25 exporters answered the question about the effects of the "recent recession" and 20
answered the question about the effects of "any other recession".  With regard to the 1982/83
recession, 9 firms first exported more than 10 per cent of their production prior to 1983.  Of
these, 2 increased their exports in response to the recent recession and 1 of those 2 increased
its exports in response to "another recession" (probably 1982/83).  Of the firms which
indicated that they were exporting less than 10 per cent of sales in 1982/83, 2 said that the
incentive to export was greater in the recent recession than it was in 1982/83.24
4.4 An Export Supply Equation
In an attempt to gather evidence for sunk costs and hysteresis, the following model
of manufactured exports was estimated using quarterly data from March 1970 to
December 1992:















































The following notation applies:
t - a time trend
D - a dummy variable which takes the value unity on and after
March 1986  (the 65th observation)
protect - the effective rate of assistance to manufacturers36
x - real manufactured exports (logarithm)
twi - the real trade-weighted exchange rate (logarithm)
tp - trading partner's industrial production index weighted by exports
(logarithm).  (Moving weights capture the recent switch to Asia37)
gne - real GNE (logarithm)
A full list of estimates is provided in Appendix C.38  The variable gne was found to
be insignificant (p-value = 0.14).  The following long-run estimates from a
reparameterisation (a Bewley transformation) were obtained after gne was excluded:
36 The construction and interpretation of this series is described in Appendix D.  It is measured as
a proportion; that is, 20 per cent is 0.2.
37 This is because their share of Australia's exports has been rising recently.25
Table 1: Long-run Elasticities





As expected, exchange rate depreciations and world growth increase export
volumes.  The perverse sign of the coefficient measuring the effective rate of
assistance results largely from an inexplicably strong decline in exports in the early
1970s, coincident with the large tariff reductions.  To remove the effect of this
episode, the model was re-estimated from December 1974 and the following
estimated long-run coefficients were obtained:
Table 2: Long-run Elasticities





This table illustrates the difficulties involved in modelling exports that were alluded
to earlier.  Though the significance of the parameters suffers substantially from the
shorter estimation period, the main point to be made is that the declines in
protection explain most of the growth in exports in this regression.  The surprisingly
                                                                                                                                  
38 The estimation technique was OLS with a Newey-West correction for a nonscalar identity
covariance matrix.  Serial correlation was present, which implies inconsistent estimates, given
the lagged dependent variable.  The equation was estimated using IV with the broken trend as
an instrument for x.  The main result, namely that gne was insignificant and the broken trend
was significant, was verified.  A cointegrating relationship was found between exports and its
explanators (excluding gne).  Nevertheless, in order to verify the main result, the model was
run in a difference form.  Again gne was insignificant while the dummy was significant.
39 This elasticity is defined as the per cent increase in exports resulting from a one percentage
point increase in the effective rate of assistance to manufacturers.26
low elasticities for the exchange rate and the growth of our trading partners may be
the result of the timing of the late 1980s tariff cuts, which mirrored the export
surge.40  The true values of the elasticities probably lie somewhere between the sets
of estimates generated over the different sample periods.  Having examined the
properties of the export equation, it is now shown that it provides some evidence for
the importance of sunk costs and the existence of hysteretic episodes in the late
1980s.
Econometric validation of sunk costs requires testing for a "hurdle" that exporters
must surmount.  Krugman (1989) argues that sunk costs should make trade flows
"rather unresponsive" to the exchange rate.  Developing this idea further, if the
situation arose where exports were totally unresponsive to some range of changes in
exchange rates, world demand and domestic demand, it might seem plausible that
there was a "hurdle" for exporters in the form of sunk costs.  This would contrast
with the standard model where any shock to these explanators should cause exports
to change.
However, this "hurdle test" is too broad.  The sunk cost model has shown that
external shocks change the world price in domestic currency.  This induces a change
in the output of every exporting firm.  Therefore, changes in world demand or the
exchange rate will alter aggregate exports as in the standard model: neither model
predicts that exports will be totally unresponsive to changes in the exchange rate or
world demand.41  As seen above, our export model estimated over the full sample
period showed that both the real exchange rate and a measure of world demand
designed to capture the increased trade with Asia were significant, and took the
correct signs.
However, the hurdle test works for domestic demand shocks since the output price
for exporting firms, PW, does not change.  Therefore, a testable implication of the
sunk cost model which clearly discriminates it from the standard model is that
domestic demand shocks will not effect aggregate exports if PW-PL is in a band of
inaction.  This differs from the standard model where any decline in domestic
40 An alternative is that tariffs really do explain all the growth in the late 1980s.  If this is so, then
a strong tariff effect on imports should also be observable.
41 This is true if exports are already occurring.27
demand will cause exports to increase.42  If the standard model is correct, the effect
of domestic demand movements on manufactured exports should be detectable,
given the large proportion of manufactured output that is sold domestically.43  The
estimated export model failed to find a significant relationship between real
manufactured exports and GNE.  This can be thought of as a failure to reject a joint
null hypothesis that the sunk cost model is correct and that PW-PL was in a band of
inaction due to sunk costs.  Naturally this result has to be seen in the light of the
econometric difficulties encountered.  As with earlier studies, the identification of a
well-specified export equation has proved difficult.  However, the insignificance of
the domestic demand variable fails to support  the standard model and is
consistent with the sunk cost model.  Armed with this prior, the late 1980s export
surge is given an hysteretic interpretation.
The structural break term in the export equation was significant when the model was
estimated over the full sample (l2 = 0.01, p-value = 0.00).44  This is consistent with
the result that real manufactured exports have a unit root around a broken trend,
with the break in 1986.45  The conventional explanators in the preferred version of
the model did not remove the need for the break; it remained significant and
accounted for 4 percentage points of the 16 per cent average annual growth in real
manufactured exports since 1986.  This surge in exports is interpreted as arising
partly from an hysteretic shock to local supply caused by the exchange rate
depreciation.46  This empirical observation of a structural break forms part of a body
42 Despite this, bands of inaction do not always imply the possibility of hysteresis.  A band of
inaction may exist if C is incurred each period.  The survey is relied upon to establish that some
costs are sunk.  Given this, bands of inaction do imply the possibility of hysteresis.
43 If a small proportion of manufactured output was sold domestically, it could be empirically
difficult to find a significant relationship between exports and domestic demand.  As it is, 70
per cent of manufactured output is sold domestically.
44 In part, models with significant structural breaks were preferred to other models in the
estimation process.  The late 1980s surge in exports resulted in the estimated equations having
either a significant structural break or, in a few versions of the model, very high exchange rate
elasticities.  Believing the latter result implied that exports were "explosive".  See Appendix C.
45 There is very strong evidence that the series is "explosive" unless there is a structural break.
That is, the effects of an innovation to exports will magnify through time rather than die down.
As this is highly implausible for an economic time series, the few versions of the model which
did not have a significant structural break were abandoned.  See Appendix C.
46 While the late 1980s surge is modelled as a broken trend, it is not anticipated that recent rates
of growth will continue indefinitely after the effects of hysteretic shocks, tariff reductions and
vanguards have run their course.28
of evidence which suggests hysteresis.  Though other explanations for the structural
break could conceivably be given, the econometric validation of the sunk cost
model, together with the survey evidence, lends substantial weight to this
interpretation.
It will be recalled that the sunk cost model offers an explanation for the belief
(backed up by the survey evidence) that the most recent recession seems to have
affected exports, in contrast to earlier recessions.  This assertion is supported by the
econometric model.  In order to demonstrate this, the following term was added to
the original regression:
m
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The dummy variable, D*, took the value unity during the period March 1990 until
September 1991.  The inclusion of these terms had little impact on the other
estimates.  Nevertheless, these slope dummies were jointly significant
(p-value = 0.00), and the p-value for the test of significance of the original gne terms
rose from 0.13 to 0.75.  In other words, almost all of the explanatory power of gne
comes from the recent recession.
This suggests that the shock in 1986 set the stage for the subsequent recession
having an impact on exports.  Up until that time, PW-PL was in a band of inaction.
Nevertheless, in the sunk cost model, the subsequent recovery need not act to
reduce exports.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to explain recent manufactured export growth by a simple
addition to the so-called standard model.  The sunk-cost model explains firms'
export success in terms of their cost structures, in particular their  sunk cost
structures.  This consideration of sunk costs has been a fruitful exercise, both from a
theoretical and empirical point of view.29
Theoretically, the net of possible causes of hysteresis has been cast further to
include world demand and domestic demand.  Changes in these determinants of
exports, or in the exchange rate, can permanently alter market structure.  These
hysteretic effects can be magnified if the initial entry into a market is made by an
export vanguard that reduces sunk costs for subsequent entrants.  The existence of
these positive  externalities is a theoretical aspect of the oft-cited
"internationalisation" of Australia's manufacturing sector.  Another aspect is the
access to cheaper imported inputs which, to the extent that sunk costs are important,
could help explain the discrete surge in exports.
Empirically, the sunk cost model has received some support on a macroeconomic
level by the existence of bands of inaction and on a microeconomic level by the
testimony of individual firms.  It appears that the historic depreciation in the mid-
1980s enabled many firms to cover their sunk costs and export for the first time.
The claim that the most recent recession, in contrast to the 1982/83 recession, has
encouraged export growth makes sense in the hysteretic framework.  Even though
the 1982/83 recession was of a comparable magnitude, the higher value of the
exchange rate at that time meant that there was insufficient incentive to pay the sunk
costs.  The tariff reductions in the early 1970s, as well as being somewhat sudden,
may not have induced a supply shock large enough to force firms to incur the sunk
costs necessary for exporting.  The gulf of opportunities between selling
domestically and selling abroad did not widen until later.
The catalytic role of the exchange rate in the process of structural change cannot be
overstated.  As well as causing an increase in the number of exporting firms in the
mid-1980s directly, the other macroeconomic shocks became effective in changing
market structure in the late-1980s because the exchange rate had depreciated.
Furthermore, the increased volatility in the exchange rate observed since the float is
seen to be of less consequence when sunk costs are important.  Small fluctuations in
the exchange rate will not motivate firms to  become exporters, even if they do
motivate existing exporters to change the level or destination of their output.
Nevertheless, the model does not support the view that exchange rate depreciations
or recessions are  necessary to motivate firms to pay sunk costs.  If increasing
exports were a policy objective, further tariff reductions, or government assistance
to cover firm's sunk costs, would accomplish the same thing.
Whatever the nature of the shock, the assertion that hysteresis occurred in the late-
1980s is equivalent to the assertion that a structural change occurred to Australia's30
balance of payments.  Hysteresis, like structural change, implies a measure of
resilience in the face of adverse shocks.  If the late-1980s saw exporters establish
beachheads around the world for Australia's manufactured exports, and, if this was
aided by tariff reductions which will not be undone, it is to be expected that neither
ebb nor flow of internal and external shocks will easily uproot them.31
APPENDIX A: MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
A three-period model is used to illustrate the effect of a shock that is subsequently
reversed.  The initial period is one in which there are no exports because of the
presence of sunk costs.  In the second period, a shock occurs that makes exports
profitable; firms make the decision to export sequentially (one by one), changing the
number of firms that export and, thereby, the market structure.  In the final period,
the shock is reversed but the changed market structure ensures that output continues
to be sold overseas.  In each period, a representative firm must decide how much to
produce47 and whether it should export.  Exporting output involves paying a sunk
cost, C.  There is an order of magnitude more firms in the world market than in the
domestic market.  Switching output between the two markets therefore changes PL
but not PW.  For simplicity, it is assumed that an individual firm ignores its own
effect on PL when it maximizes profits.  However, the next firm in the sequential
decision making process makes its decisions using the altered PL.
In the standard model, the gap between supply and demand at  PW is exported.
However, in the presence of a sunk cost, if a firm is to export it must make extra
profits (compared to selling domestically), the discounted sum of which is at least
enough to cover the sunk costs.  For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that
exports will occur as soon as this is the case.  (This is contrary to Dixit (1989)
where it is shown how it can be optimal to wait.)
In the presence of C it will be optimal for a risk-neutral firm to export all its output,
if it exports any.48  Hereafter, an "exporting firm" is one that exports all its output.
For a given number of exporting firms, local and total supply may then be defined.49
It is assumed that a firm will export as soon as the sum of the present value of
profits from exporting exceeds the sum of the present value of profits from selling
47 It is assumed that there is no production smoothing and that firms maximise profits over the
whole three periods.
48 Given PW is higher than PL, once the sunk cost is paid it makes sense to sell all the output at
the higher price.  A proof is available from the authors.
49 Total supply (S) is the output of all firms for each price level.  It is obtained by the horizontal
summation of all firms' marginal cost curves.  Local supply (s) is the sum of the marginal cost
curves for the firms that sell all their output domestically.32
locally.  This requires that firms ignore the variance of prices.  Given an assumption
that all shocks are thought to be permanent, entry will occur in, say, the second
period if:
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where nL output sold locally by a representative firm
nW output exported by a representative firm
TC(nL+nW) total cost function
d 1 - the discount rate
If d is close to unity, this yields an expositionally useful approximation:
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Ignoring discounting (d = 1), this approximation states that the decision to export
will be made if, in each of the two remaining periods, at least one-half of the sunk
cost can be recouped.  The presence of discounting merely says that a firm needs to
expect to do a little better than this before it will export, to cover the opportunity
cost of spending C.
If the TC function were known, it would be possible to solve the above inequality
for PW-PL (d hereafter) , at least numerically.50  The "export premium", d, is clearly
an increasing function of C.51  The top of the band of inaction is d.  That is, PW
 must
exceed PL by at least d before it will be profitable to export.  The bottom of the
band of inaction is zero because a local price above PW will immediately result in a
representative firm ceasing to export.
The diagrams in the text are consistent with this simple model.
50 Experimentation with simple TC functional forms often produced analytically intractable results
because nL is functionally related to PL.
51 Furthermore, in this three period model d will actually change size each period because there
are fewer periods in which to cover the sunk cost.  This is ignored as it does not change the
sense of the results.33
APPENDIX B: SAMPLE SURVEY RESULTS
Table B1: Survey Questions
Q1: Approximately what percentage of your produce
do you export? mean = 30.9  s= 31.6
Q2 : Name the first year in which you exported
more than 10% of your produce (those who answered 1986 meant
volumes: see text)
 I am now going to read out some costs relating to exports .
When I say "cost" it can mean money , time, or
inconvenience. For each type of cost I'm going to ask:
(a) Is it  a significant cost?
(b) Does your spending on it fall
after you have established your % answering " Yes"
presence in an overseas market.
Q3 : Overseas trips (a)%     (b) %
(a) & (b) 53         17
Q4 : Maintaining overseas reps.
(a) & (b) 43         13
Q5 :  market research
(a) & (b) 20         10
Q6 : Long-distance communication
(a) & (b) 60         13
Q7 : Trade Fairs and establishing brand awareness
(a) & (b) 30         17
Q8 : Red tape
(a) & (b) 57         27
Q9 : Offshore production to get a foot in the door.
 (a) & (b) 13         13
Q10 : Protecting patents and copyrights
(a) & (b) 37         13
Q11 : Running a distribution network
(a) & (b) 23         10
Q12 : Purchases of plant or machinery specifically
related to exports (a) & (b) 47         47
Q13 : Why did you commence exporting?
Q14 : Has the recent recession (since 1990) caused
your firm to significantly increase its exports? 40
Q15 : Has any other recession in the past caused
your firm to significantly increase its exports? 14
Q16 : Do you think that when Australian import tariffs are cut
further your business will export more produce? Why? 9
Q17 : Has the reduction in tariffs on imported inputs
significantly reduced your firm's costs? 20
Q18 : Was the exchange rate an important factor
when you first decided to export? 60
Q19 : What region do you export the most produce to?
 Has this region become easier to sell to since 1985? 48
Q20 : Have other Australian firms paved the way
for your exports? If so, how? 2 yes, 2 firms helped others34
Questions 3 to 12 aim to establish whether a group of fixed costs are sunk and
significant.  If respondents questioned what a "significant" cost was, they were
asked if they considered it when evaluating an export project.  Out of a total of 59
appropriate firms contacted52, there were 30 useable responses.53  This was
sufficient to invoke the Central Limit Theorem.  A 95 per cent confidence interval
for the proportion of firms with a certain characteristic can be no wider than:54
$ .
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For a sample size of 30 the confidence interval for the proportion of firms with at
least one significant sunk cost is [0.9122 0.5544].  Therefore, more than half of
manufacturing exporters have at least one significant sunk cost.  The confidence
interval for the proportion of firms with significant sunk costs in the area of export-
related plant and equipment is [0.6456 0.2878].
These results are in no way overturned by the small sample size.  Examining
equation (5), there is no need to make any allowances for the small sample size
beyond those already made.  The calculation of the standard error factors in the
small sample size and widens the interval.
The really crucial issue for the robustness of the results is the random sampling
assumption.55  In this regard, the survey uncovered a similar pattern of initial
exporting as did the McKinsey and Co. report.  The latter used more than ten times
as many respondents (310) and had an Australia-wide focus.  Yet both samples
indicate that a large number of firms commenced exporting for the first time in
1986.
52 Of the 100 names provided, 3 were excluded because their line of business determined their
order on the alphabetical listing, and a further 5 were excluded because they appeared on the
database more than once.  Firms were then contacted in alphabetical order from the remaining
list of 92.  When the goal of 30 successful interviews had been reached 12 firms had not been
contacted at all.  Of the 80 firms contacted, 21 indicated that they were not exporters of
manufactured output.
53 30 executives agreed to the telephone interviews, 2 declined and 27 could not be contacted.
54 The width is conservatively large because it uses the maximum possible value of the variance
of  $ p, rather than the estimated variance ( $ p(1- $ p)/n).
55 Selecting 30 respondents by a process that has been randomised is arguably better than, say,
citing the views of 30 conference participants (a non-random sample) as "anecdotal evidence".35
APPENDIX C: REGRESSION RESULTS
Table C1: Estimates of the Auto-Regressive Distributed-Lag (ADL) Model
(R2
adj. = .98, DW = 2.05, p-value for c2 
 test of all regressors = 0.0000)




(t - 64)D 0.0111 3.6
x t-1 0.4117 4.3
x t-2 0.0649 0.7
x t-3 0.2601 2.7
x t-4 -0.0685 -0.9
twi t -0.0253 -0.2
twi t-1 -0.1236 -0.6 twi
twi t-2 -0.4487 -1.6 c2
calc
 =16.92
twi t-3 0.8388 2.7 p-value=0.0047
twi t-4 -0.3994 -2.3
protect t 1.6900 2.3 protect
protect t-1 1.7362 2.3 c2
calc
 =24.53
protect t-2 -1.9943 -2.8 p-value=0.0000
tp t 0.3461 0.9 tp
tp t-1 -0.1495 -0.3 c2
calc
 =31.81
tp t-2 0.5512 1.4 p-value=0.0000
Variable Lag Coefficient t-statistic H0:explanators
jointly zero
gne t -0.2826 -0.9
gne t-1 -0.1958 -0.5 gne
gne t-2 -0.0260 -0.1 c2
calc
 =8.37
gne t-3 -0.2530 -0.5 p-value=0.14
gne t-4 0.4425 1.336
GNE was excluded on the basis of these tests (with  a=.05).  A  Bewley
Transformation of the ADL was then estimated using xt-1 as an instrument for Dxt.
The long-run coefficients cited in the text were then obtained.  Even in the presence
of a  cointegrating relationship, the calculated test statistics in the  Bewley
transformation are not necessarily t-distributed.  However, in small samples they
may outperform the Phillips-Hansen fully modified estimator as Inder (1991) has
shown.  In any case, the model was also run in difference form.  Both the
insignificance of gne and the significance of the broken trend were verified.
A test for cointegration due to Kremers et al. (1992) rejects the null hypothesis of no
cointegration at the 5 per cent level (test statistic, -5.3).  The sum of the coefficients
on t and (t - 64)D is approximately 0.01, implying that the broken trend after March
1986 adds 1 per cent per quarter (around 4 per cent per annum) onto export growth.
That is, the conventional explanators explain roughly three quarters of the 16 per
cent per annum average growth in manufactured exports since 1986.
An examination of the time series properties of exports indicates that the series is
explosive56.  The Phillips-Peron Zt test, with a constant and no trend, rejects the null
of a unit root in favour of the alternative that the series is explosive at the 5 per cent
level (test statistic, 2.7190).  Four lags are sufficient to eliminate autocorrelation for
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test.  The null is rejected in favour of an explosive
series at the 5 per cent level (test statistic, 1.98).
The conclusion that exports are explosive is highly suggestive of a structural break.
Therefore, Peron's test for  stationarity around a broken trend is an appropriate
diagnostic procedure.  The test requires that a structural break be imposed a priori.
The first quarter of 1986 is used because both the McKinsey report and the sample
survey in this paper indicate that many firms commenced exporting around then.
The null that the series has a unit root around a broken trend is not rejected at the 5
per cent level (test statistic, -0.1627).  Given this result, it became a prior that the
final model should have a significant structural break.  There were versions of the
model where the structural break was insignificant and the exchange rate had a very
56 That is, a time series model of x has the lagged-dependent variable coefficient significantly
greater than unity.37
high exchange rate elasticity, but these were abandoned because the time series
properties of the model became very unclear.57
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation were often problems in the various versions
of the ADL.  Increasing the lag lengths58 fails to remedy autocorrelation and the
resultant loss of degrees of freedom creates other problems.59  Therefore, the
preferred version of the model is estimated using a  Newey-West correction for
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity60.  The presence of serial correlation in the
estimated model implies inconsistent estimates because of the presence of a lagged
dependent variable.  Therefore the model was estimated using instrumental
variables.  The somewhat unorthodox instrument used for exports was the broken
trend.  The significance of the broken trend was established as was the
insignificance of gne.
The real exchange rate is used to capture changes in PW relative to PL in the model.
Conventional measures of relative prices exhibit a perverse negative correlation with
the broken trend.61  Including one of them in the regression introduces
multicollinearity and implies a significant role for relative prices, but of the wrong
sign.  This is mistaken both from a theoretical and practical point of view.  Some
57 With a structural break on the RHS of the equation,  premultiplication by the orthogonal
projection matrix M (with X being the broken trend) collapses the problem into modelling an
I(1) series.  Without the structural break, an explosive series is being modelled.  Inference is
therefore unclear.
58 The variables gne and twi appear in the model with four lags, indicating that adjustments to
shocks takes considerable time.  Somewhat arbitrarily, the variables tp and protect appear with
two lags because it is judged that they are easier to adjust to.  It is assumed that they can be
foreseen to a greater degree.
59 In some estimated versions increasing the lag length appeared to make autocorrelation worse,
and, reduces the significance of other estimated parameters.
60 In RATS, the command is (robusterrors,lags=8,damp=1).  Eight lags are used because it is
judged that this is a reasonable time for dynamic adjustments to occur.  LM tests indicate that
serial correlation of this order was a problem in some cases.
61 px/pgne is a proxy for the ratio of the domestic price of manufactured exports to the domestic
price of non-traded manufactures.  If pman is the local price of manufactured goods, px/pman
measures the incentive for a firm to export its output rather than sell it locally.  Both relative
prices trended down over the sample period with a pronounced downturn since the mid-1980s,
coinciding with the export boom.38
exporters contacted in the survey clearly stated that relative prices were instrumental
in their decision to export.62
A modified version of the Chow predictive failure test is useful for ascertaining the
extent to which a model explains groups of observations.  Several dummy variables
are used to entirely explain a group of observations.  The joint significance of the
dummies is then tested.  A model which fits the data well is not improved greatly by
the inclusion of the dummies.  Conversely, significant dummies indicate that a
model does not easily explain the observations in question.
For this particular model, successive regressions are run starting at the beginning of
the data set.  In each regression four consecutive observations are "soaked up" by
four dummies.  After testing their joint significance, the same procedure is repeated
with four new dummies advanced one time period.  The results from these "rolling
dummies" regressions are summarized in the following figure.
Figure 18 : Significance of Rolling Dummies












critical value = 9.48773
62 It may be that the relative price movement reflects declining Australian productivity vis a vis
the rest of the world.  However, the puzzle remains as to why some survey respondents
indicated that they exported because of relative price differentials.  (A case in point was a
capital goods firm which started to export because the local price of its output fell considerably
more than the export price).  In the end it was decided to use the real exchange rate because its
movements accorded with the survey evidence suggesting that export profitability must have
recently improved.39
These results imply that estimating the model over sub-periods could generate
different coefficient estimates.  This suspicion is borne out when the above model is
estimated over the sub-period December 1974 to December 1992.  This period is
chosen because it excludes the effects of the massive 6 percentage point reduction
in the effective rate of assistance to manufacturers in December 1973.  Estimating
the model over this period gives the long run coefficients in the text.
Given this feature of the model, the temptation is to estimate over the period that
gives the best results.  Therefore a discipline imposed on the procedure is that the
preferred model uses the maximum amount of data available.  Otherwise the
exercise takes on an entirely ad hoc character.
Given the problems of serial correlation and parameter instability, the estimated
model cannot claim to be a full representation of export supply.  However, the most
important results are robust to different specifications.  A break occurred in 1986
and gne does not, in general, explain manufactured exports.40
APPENDIX D: DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS
Manufactured Exports
In this paper Australian manufactured exports are defined to be the
categories “Machinery”, “Transport equipment” and “Other
manufactures” as used in the ABS Catalogue No. 5302.0.  This definition
coincides with Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) sections
5-8, less divisions 67 and 68, and so excludes some Simply Transformed
Manufactures (STMs) such as iron and steel.
Current price seasonally adjusted estimates of these series were available
from the ABS from September quarter 1969.  Constant price estimates,
however, were only available from the same source from the September
quarter of 1974.  This series was extended back to September quarter 1969
by splicing the percentage changes of the implicit price  deflator for the
category “Metals, metal manufactures, machinery and transport
equipment“ as used in the ABS Catalogue no. 5421.0.
The Real Exchange Rate
The measure of the real exchange rate used in this paper was first
calculated by Jones and  Wilkinson (1990).  It is the geometric weighted
average of the bilateral real exchange rates for 22 of Australia’s major
trading partners.  The bilateral real exchange rates are estimated using each
country’s consumer price index as the price  deflator.  The weights are
based on annual shares of merchandise trade, interpolated on a quarterly
basis.
Overseas Demand
The series for overseas demand is a geometric weighted average of changes
in industrial production of 19 of Australia’s major trading partners.  The
weights are based on three-year moving averages of merchandise export
shares for those countries.41
Domestic Demand
The measure of domestic demand used in this paper is Gross National
Expenditure in constant price terms, seasonally adjusted, as published by
the ABS Catalogue No. 5206.0.
Effective Rate of Assistance
The Industry Commission has published estimates the average effective
rate of assistance for manufacturing on an annual basis since 1968-69
(Plunkett et al. 1992).  The effective rate of assistance is a broader concept
than the effective rate of protection.  It includes non-border interventions
that differentially influence the returns to value-adding factors in an
industry.  The estimates comprise four overlapping series compiled on
different base years.  Ideally, the series should be calculated with moving
weights to reflect the changing patterns of manufacturing production.
Therefore, " ...the estimates for all years other than the base year in each
series should be regarded as only general indicators of the assistance levels
received by the manufacturing sector." (Plunkett et al. 1992 p.49).  These
four overlapping series were spliced together and then converted to a
quarterly series by assuming that changes in assistance only occurred at
the start of the September quarter of each year, that is, the effective rate of
assistance remained constant within each financial year.42
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